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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
MINERAL RIGHTS -ALIENATION OF STATE-OWNED MINERAL
RIGHTS
Plaintiff instituted a jactitory action against defendant
Levee Board which defendant converted into a petitory action.
In 1911, pursuant to the present La. R.S. 38:700, the land was
conveyed to the defendant Levee Board which never entered into
corporeal possession of it. Plaintiff claims title from a 1912
sheriff's sale and has been in continuous corporeal possession of
the property. Plaintiff's pleas of ten and thirty years prescrip-
tion were sustained below and affirmed on appeal. Held, by
acquisitive prescription plaintiff had acquired full ownership of
both surface and mineral rights to the property. King v. Board
of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 148
So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) cert. den.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that "prescription shall
not run against the State in any civil matter,"' and since 1921
it has prohibited alienation of mineral rights by the state.2 Judi-
cial interpretation has narrowed the scope of these prohibitions.
The prohibition against alienation of mineral rights first came
before the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Board of Commission-
ers of Tensas Basin Levee District v. Grace,3 in which the state
was held not obliged to reserve the mineral rights in lands trans-
ferred to a levee district pursuant to statutes enacted prior to
1921. 4 The decision contains additional language plainly indicat-
ing that a levee district could not sell the land so granted with-
out reserving the minerals.5 Dicta in Board of Commissioners
1. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16 (1921); La. Const. art. 193 (1913); La.
Const. art. 193 (1898): "Prescription shall not run against the State in any
civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution or expressly by law."
2. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all
property sold by the State shall be reserved, except where the owner or other
person having the right to redeem may buy or redeem property sold or adjudi-
cated to the State for taxes."
3. 161 La. 1039, 109 So. 830 (1926).
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 1044, 109 So. at 832: "The state, should it transfer the land to the
district, including the mineral rights, in accordance with the grant made by it,
would not be parting with the property within the meaning of the constitutional
section cited, but would only be placing it under the control of one of its agen-
cies for the purpose of constructing and maintaining levees. The land would, to
all practical intents and purposes, still be the property of the state. The district
could not sell it without reserving to itself the mineral rights, for the reason
that its creator, for whom it holds, could not do so." The majority in the in-
stant case termed this language "obiter dictum." 148 So. 2d at 142. See also
Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee Dis-
trict,.231 La. 299, 91 So. 2d 353 (1956).
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of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., indicated that a levee
district could not lose mineral rights in such lands by prescrip-
tion.7 This indication was not based on a theory that prescrip-
tion could not run against the levee district -indeed the case
held that prescription does run against a state agency even
though it cannot run against the state- but on the theory that
the levee district could not lose by prescription that which it
could not alienate.8
The 1921 prohibition against state alienation of mineral
rights is not retroactive ;9 thus it has been held that land and
mineral rights may be acquired from a state agency by prescrip-
tion which accrued prior to 1921.10 Some cases further held that
acquisition of a particular tract prior to 1921 included mineral
rights, even though additional steps after 1921 were necessary
to perfect title.' The most convincing decisions apply the doc-
trine of after-acquired title.12 No previous case was found in
which mineral rights were held to be acquired by prescription
6. 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929).
7. Id. at 810, 120 So. at 376: "If the question presented involved the loss
by prescription of the mineral rights themselves, on land conveyed or certified
to a levee district, under the Constitution of 1921, we should most likely hold,
in view of the conclusion reached in State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of
Tensas Levee District v. Grace . . . that, as the levee district must retain such
mineral rights, it could not lose by prescription that which it must retain, and
cannot alienate."
8. Ibid.
9. See Haas v. Board of Commissioners of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou
Boeuf Levee District, 206 La. 378, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944); Board of Commis-
sioners of Tensas Levee District v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619 (1929).
10. Ibid. The rationale of decisions allowing prescription to run against a
state agency is considered in text accompanying note 23 infra.
11. See Lum Chow v. Board of Commissioners for Lafourche Basin Levee
District, 203 La. 268, 13 So. 2d 857 (1943) ; Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co.
v. Board of Commissioners of Atchafalaya Levee District, 200 La. 1049, 9 So. 2d
409 (1942) ; State e.r rel. Hyam's Heirs v. Grace, 197 La. 428, 1 So. 2d 683
(1941); Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Allison, 196 La. 838, 200 So. 273 (1941);
Barnett v. State Mineral Board, 193 La. 1055, 192 So. 701 (1939) ; Rycade Oil
Corp. v. Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 129
So. 2d 302 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied. The constitutional prohibition
contains one exception: if land is adjudicated to the state for nonpayment of
taxes and the tax debtor, his administrator, executor, assign or successor obtains
the property through a sheriff's sale per LA. R.S. 47:2189 (1950), the tax debtor
acquires mineral rights. See Sims v. State Mineral Board, 219 La. 342, 53 So. 2d
124 (1951). But if land adjudicated to the state for nonpayment of taxes is
subsequently sold, the state reserving the mineral rights, the tax debtor has no
right to redeem the mineral rights. See Lyons v. State Mineral Board, 22 So. 2d
774 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). The decision invites discussion, but it is beyond'
the scope of this Note.
. 12. See Lum Chow v. Board of Commissioners for Lafourche Basin Levee *
District, 203 La. 268, 13 So. 2d 857 (1943) ; Rycade Oil Corp. v. Board of Com-
missioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 129 So. 2d 302 (La. App.'
3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied.
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commenced prior to 1921 but completed thereafter. 8 In 1959
Stokes v. Harrison4 decided that a parish school board was not
"the state" and therefore could alienate mineral rights.15 Stokes
was the first case which allowed a state agency to alienate min-
eral rights after 1921. It reached this result by employing a
technique of interpretation well illustrated in cases holding that
prescription runs against state agencies as distinguished from
"the state."' 6 This technique had not been previously employed
in cases of alienation of state mineral rights.'7 The decision
13. The instant case may so hold. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
14. 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959).
15. Ibid. The court announced that the language of the Grace case, quoted
in note 5 supra and the dicta in the Pure Oil case, quoted in note 7 supra were
"not necessary for the decision." Id. at 361, 115 So. 2d at 380.
16. That prescription does not run against the state is an adaptation of the
common law maxim that time never runs against the King. In two early cases,
Louisiana courts held that under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3521 (1870) prescription
ran against the state, no exception being made in its favor. Graham v. Tignor,
23 La. Ann. 570 (1871) ; State v. White's Heirs, 23 La. Ann. 733 (1871). The
court soon retreated from this position, particularly in cases of delinquent tax-
payers attempting to assert liberative prescription. See Reed v. His Creditors,
39 La. Ann. 115, 1 So. 784 (1887) ; Succession of Zacharie, 30 La. Ann. 1260
(1878) ; Lesassier & Binder v. Board of Liquidation, 30 La. Ann. 611 (1878).
Since 1898 the Louisiana Constitution has provided that prescription does not
run against the state in any civil matter. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16 (1921);
La. Const. art. 193 (1913); La. Const. art. 193 (1898). The courts have ap-
plied the provision in a variety of cases. See Scorsune v. State of Louisiana
through the Department of Highways, 230 La. 254, 88 So. 2d 211 (1956) Quaker
Realty Co. v. Maier-Watt Realty Co., 134 La. 1030, 64 So. 897 (1914) ; State v.
F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 58 So. 1033 (1912) ; State v. New Or-
leans Debenture Redemption Co., 112 La. 1, 36 So. 205 (1904) ; State v. Spence
& Goldstein, 6 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Lindner v. Roth, 11 Orl. App.
301 (La. App. OrI. Cir. 1914) ; In re Zahn, 8 Orl. App. 69 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1910). But on several occasions prescription has been allowed to run against a
state agency. See Haas v. Board of Commissioners of Red River, Atchafalaya
and Bayou Boeuf Levee District, 206 La. 378, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944) ; Board of
Commissioners of Tensas Levee District v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619
(1929) ; Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167
La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929) ; Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v.
Toyo Kisen Kaisba, 163 La. 865, 113 So. 127 (1927). The following language
was used in the foundation case: "And in view of R.C.C. art. 3521, which de-
clares that prescritpion runs against all persons unless they are included in some
exception established by law, we are not prepared to hold that the exception thus
established in favor of the state applies to any or all other public corporations or
agencies; for this constitutional provision is only the reduction to statutory form
of a principle of public law already long established by universal jurisprudence,
which principle has very generally been confined to actions brought by and in the
name of the state itself." Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. Toyo
Kisen Kaisha, 163 La. 865, 866, 113 So. 127, 128 (1927). It appears that the
metaphysical distinction between "the state" and a state agency as a "separate
and distinct entity" is the basis for allowing prescription to run against a state
agency: "Plaintiff has, and always has had, the right to sue and be sued in its
corporate name. It is a separate entity from the state, created by the state, it is
true, to accomplish cretain public purposes, but is nevertheless distinct from it."
Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801,
812, 120 So. 373, 377 (1929). In essence Stokes v. Harrison adopts the same
metaphysics and applies it to the prohibition of state alienation of mineral rights.
17. Stokes does not rely on the cases on prescription against the state. In-
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left unclear to whom the constitutional prohibition applied.18
The court in the King case gave two reasons for sustaining
the pleas of prescription: first, relying on Stokes, that the Con-
stitution does not prohibit a state agency from alienating min-
eral rights; second, that prescription commenced prior to 1921
was unaffected by the constitutional prohibition adopted that
year.19 In holding the constitutional prohibition inapplicable to
a state agency, the majority follows Stokes in employing a
metaphysical distinction between "the state" and a state
agency, 20 a distinction which as a matter of logic is at least
debatable. 21 More than logic is involved, however; policy con-
siderations may make the distinction between "the state" and
a state agency desirable in some cases but not in others. 22 It is
stead, it examines cases inquiring into the nature, character, and powers of a
school board. Ellis v. Acadia Parish School Board, 211 La. 29, 29 So. 2d 461
(1946), whether school board has power to lease sixteenth section lands; State
v. Coulon, 197 La. 1058, 3 So. 2d 241 (1941), whether holding offices of school
-board member and of clerk of court violates statute making dual office holding a
criminal offense (no) ; State ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham, 173 La. 488, 137 So. 862
(1931), whether school board member is an officer of the state within the mean-
ing of LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 4, prohibiting dual office holding (yes) ; Henderson
v. City of Shreveport, 160 La. 360, 107 So. 139 (1926), whether school board has
authority to sell lands not needed for school sites 'but acquired for that purpose;
Chase v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, 89 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1956), whether school board is a public board within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Statute (yes) ; State ex rel. Debellevue v. Ledoux, 3 So. 2d
188 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941), whether school board member is a state officer
within the meaning of LA. CONST. art. IV, § 7, providing for appeal to the Su-
preme Court in case of removal of state officer from office (no) ; Andrews v.
Claiborne Parish School Board, 189 So. 355 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
whether school board has power to discharge a teacher. The court observes that
nowhere has a school board been called "the state" and proceeds to consider the
characteristics of "the state." Essentially the same judicial method has been
employed in cases of prescription running against the state.
18. The court quotes three different definitions of "state" and without choosing
between them apparently concludes that the constitutional prohibition applies
only to the "sovereign." See Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373
(1959). See also Note, 21 LA. L. REv. 271 (1960).
19. King v. Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dis-
trict, 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied. Judge Tate con-
curred on the second ground only. Id. at 145.
20. Both Stoke8 and King find that the lawmaker intended to make the dip-
tinction.
21. The primary signification of "state agency" is "a body acting for the
state." No single state agency possesses all the powers of the state; nor does the
legislature or any other governmental body. Who or what, then, is "the state"?
Three different definitions of "the state" are quoted in Stokes v. Harrison, 238
La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959). The court did not attempt to choose between
the diverse definitions.
22. Reasons of policy, different in each case, may make the following all
excellent decisions in spite of seemingly contrary holdings as to the qualities of a
school board member: State ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham, 173 La. 488, 137 So. 862
(1931) that a school board member is a state officer within the meaning of
LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 4, which prohibits dual office holding; State v. Coulon,
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
suggested that considerations supporting the use of the distinc-
tion in reference to prescription running against the state differ
from those applicable to state alienation of mineral rights.
State immunity from prescription is a vestige of royal pre-
rogative which is being pared down in what appears to be a
nationwide trend to limit the immunity, especially if it is urged
by a state agency, to cases in which a governmental, not a pro-
prietary, right is being asserted. 23 Apparently the impetus be-
hind this movement is a belief that a state or its agency acting
as a proprietor should be subject to the same law as other pro-
prietors. Louisiana courts have not been able to use the dis-
tinction between governmental and proprietary rights because
of the constitutional provision that prescription shall not run
against the state,24 but they have achieved essentially the same
result by distinguishing between "the state" and a state agency.
On the other hand, the prohibition of alienation of mineral
rights by the state seems based on very different considera-
tions: first, without the prohibition there is danger that
"valuable State assets would be plundered for the benefit of a
privileged few with inside knowledge or connections, rather
than used for the benefit of all the people" ;25 second, the pro-
hibition prevents immediate divestiture of title, thereby pre-
serving benefits of these valuable assets for future generations.2 6
From the different policy considerations applicable to each of
these issues, it seems that the immunity from prescription is
197 La. 1058, 3 So. 2d 241 (1941) that a school board member does not violate
a criminal statute prohibiting dual office holding when he becomes clerk of court;
and State ex rel. Debellevue v. Ledoux, 3 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941),
that a school board member is not a state officer within the meaning of LA.
CONST. art. IV, § 7, providing for appeal to the Supreme Court if a state officer
is removed from office.
23. See 34 AM. JUR. Limitation of Actions § 395 (1941) ; 53 C.J.S. Limita-
tion of Actions § 15 (1948). Illustrative cases are Hammon v. Dixon, 232 Ark.
537, 338 S.W.2d 941 (1960) ; People v. Chambers, 37 Cal.2d 552, 233 P.2d 557
(1951) ; Winaker v. Annunzio, 409 Ill. 236, 99 N.E.2d 191 (1951) ; State Insur-
ance Fund v. Taron, 333 P.2d 508 (0kla. 1958) ; Richmond Redevelopment Corp.
& Housing Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d
574 (1954).
24. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16. The distinction was employed in cases on the
cognate sovereign immunity from suit until it was abandoned, three Justices
dissenting, in Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 229 La. 1, 85 So. 2d 10
(1955). See Texas Co. v. State Mineral Board, 216 La. 742, 44 So. 2d 841
(1949); Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209 La. 826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946);
State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 So.
519 (1939).
25. Concurring opinion of Judge Tate in King v. Board of Commissioners
for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 148 So. 2d 138, 145 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied.
26. See Note, 21 LA. L. REv. 271 (1960).
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a privilege which should be strictly construed, while the pro-
hibition against state alienation of mineral rights seems to
merit more liberal construction. As "the state" must act through
agents, it seems that since "the state" is forbidden to alienate
minerals, so its agencies must also be forbidden to do so.
Since Stokes differs from the King case factually, it may
be more congruent with the policy reflected by the prohibition
against state alienation of mineral rights than the instant case.
In Stokes the mineral rights conveyed had been acquired by
the school board from a private person, 27 while in the instant
case the mineral rights had been granted to the levee district
by the state . 2  To hold that mineral rights acquired in the
ordinary stream of commerce by a parish school board, police
jury, or other local agency, from private persons do not thereby
become inalienable may be justified as a means of keeping prop-
erty in commerce, although the holding is still somewhat in
derogation of the constitutional prohibition. But to hold, as
King appears to do, that mineral rights inalienable in the hands
of the state29 become alienable upon transfer to a state agency
appears to open the door to the very evils which the constitu-
tional prohibition sought to prevent.30 It is difficult to believe
27. See Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959).
28. King v. Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dis-
trict, 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied.
29. Since the state acquired the property in question by a tax adjudication,
it held only a defeasible title which could have been defeated by the tax debtor's
exercise of his right of redemption. LA. CONST. art. X, § 11; LA. R.S. 47:2221
(1950). This right could have been exercised "as long as the title thereto is in
the state or in any of its political subdivisions." LA. R.S. 47:2222 (1950).
Apparently, however, the right of redemption was defeated upon transfer of the
land to the levee district. See State ex rel. Hodge v. Grace, 191 La. 15, 184 So.
527 (1938) ; Emery v. Orleans Levee Board, 15 So. 2d 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1943). See generally Smith, Tax Titles, TIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL
LAW 85 (1955). Nevertheless the mineral rights may fairly be considered in-
alienable when the state acquires land by tax adjudication. The constitutional
prohibition makes a specific exception in favor of the tax debtor. But if prior to
the exercise of the right of redemption, the state conveys the land to another,
mineral rights must be reserved pursuant to the constitutional prohibition. In
this situation it has been held that the tax debtor cannot redeem the mineral
rights from the state. See Lyons v. State Mineral Board, 22 So. 2d 774 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945).
30. If the state grants land to a state agency, may the agency sell the land
without reserving the mineral rights although the state is forbidden to do so?
The question has not been decided by the court, but King strongly suggests that
the agency may do so. If so, Judge Tate's remark that "supposedly inalienable
State minerals would then be available for distribution or sale to insiders, cronies,
or other private persons" seems ominously accurate. King v. Board of Com-
missioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 148 So. 2d 138, 145 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied. Or is the Grace decision to be overruled entirely,
thus requiring the state to reserve mineral rights if it transfers land to a state
agency? If so, what effect would that have on the thousands of acres of land
1964]
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that the draftsmen of the Constitution contemplated such a
facile circumvention of the prohibition.
The second reason advanced by the court in King to sustain
the pleas of prescription is that prescription which had begun
to run prior to 1921 was not stopped by the adoption of the
new Constitution.31 This reasoning considers King as fitting
the general pattern of cases which recognized the acquisition
of land with mineral rights from the state by a transaction
prior to 1921 which required further steps after 1921 to perfect
the claimant's title.3 2 However, all the prior cases in this group
involved contractual dealings between the state and the claimant
prior to 1921 which created vested rights in the claimant,33
and it is these vested rights which the 1921 Constitution has
been held not to destroy. In King there were no contractual
dealings creating vested rights; prescription had begun to run,
but no vested rights as to title are created until prescription
accrues. 8 4 This distinguishing factor renders the result in King
questionable.
In conclusion, perhaps the King decision can be supported
on the ground that prescription had begun to run prior to 1921
and was not stopped by the adoption of the 1921 Constitution,
although the case is distinguishable from prior cases in this
area. King does not answer the ultimate question raised by
Stokes: to whom does the constitutional prohibition against
alienation of state mineral rights apply? But by suggesting that
the prohibition does not apply to a state agency whose mineral
rights were transferred to it by the state, King takes a step on
a path fraught with danger for the people of Louisiana. The
logical termination of this path is found in the conclusion that
the prohibition applies only to mineral rights the title to which
is in the State of Louisiana and that the prohibition may be
avoided by the transfer of such mineral rights to a state agency
-a transfer previously held not to be within the ambit of the
already transferred to state agencies without a specific reservation of mineral
rights by the state?
31. King v. Board of Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee Dis-
trict, 148 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied. Judge Tate concurred
on this ground only.
32. Lum Chow v. Board of Commissioners for Lafourche Basin Levee Dist.,
203 La. 268, 13 So. 2d 857 (1943).
33. See cases cited in note 11 supra. The recent decision of Lewis v. State,
156 So. 2d 431 (La. 1963) illustrates nicely the point that it is only vested rights
created prior to 1921 which the Constitution of that year did not destroy.
34. See Calvit v. Mulhollan, 12 Rob. 258, 270 (La. 1845) ; Roussel v. Railways
Realty Co., 9 Orl. App. 288 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1912).
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constitutional prohibition. 85 Therefore, it is respectfully sug-
gested that either the Supreme Court should reconsider the
problem presented in the King case at the first opportunity or
that the Louisiana Constitution should be amended to close the
door to the possible plundering of state mineral rights for the
benefit of a privileged few which may have been opened in-
advertently by the King decision.
Karl W. Cavanaugh
TORTS - LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE BLOOD BANK FURNISHING
WRONG BLOOD TYPE
Plaintiffs sued defendant blood bank, a charitable corpora-
tion independent of a hospital, for wrongful death resulting
from furnishing the wrong blood type to a hospital patient in
response to a request from her personal physician.' The bank's
customary practice was to charge for blood unless replaced by
donee. Plaintiffs sought recovery on both tort and sales war-
ranty theories. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
district court's instructed verdict for defendant. Held, chari-
table corporations are immune from tort liability when the fees
charged are devoted to charitable purposes; and since the sup-
plying of blood is the rendition of a service rather than a sale,
plaintiffs cannot recover for breach of warranty. Goelz v. J. K.
& Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961; error ref'd n.r.e.).
Litigation in the field of blood transfusions is a fairly recent
visitor to our courts. In the landmark decision of Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital2 which involved a hospital's non-negligent
supplying of impure blood8 to its patient, the door was found
closed to recovery under implied warranty. Stressing that the
supplying of blood was entirely subordinate to the over-all func-
tion of the hospital to furnish trained personnel and specialized
35. State ex rel. Board of Oommissioners of Tensas Basin Levee District v.
Grace, 161 La. 1039, 109 So. 830 (1926).
1. An employee of the blood bank whose duty it was to type and cross-match
the patient's blood failed to use the correct sample of blood when he ran tests
and recorded the results on the patient's card.
2. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (a 4/3 decision), rehearing denied,
308 N.Y. 812, 125 N.E.2d 869 (1954) ; noted 40 CORN. L.Q. 803 (1955), 69 HABV.
L. REv. 391 (1955), 31 IND. L.J. 367 (1956), 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
3. The impure blood involved was homologous serum hepatitus.
